Philosophy: deconstructionism explained and deconstructed.

Deconstructionism is academically–trendy but its meaning can be hard to pin down because its proponents avoid precise definitions.  The basic idea seems to be that words don't mean as much as we think they do.  Here is how the Stanford University Philosophy Department explains it:

[L]anguage is, as Saussure says, nothing but differences. That is, words have meaning only because of contrast-effects with other words. 'Red' means what it does only by contrast with 'blue', 'green', etc. 'Being' also means nothing except by contrast, not only with 'beings' but with 'Nature', 'God', 'Humanity', and indeed every other word in the language. No word can acquire meaning in the way in which philosophers from Aristotle to Bertrand Russell have hoped it might -- by being the unmediated expression of something non-linguistic (e.g., an emotion, a sense-datum, a physical object, an idea, a Platonic Form).

Let's focus on "[W]ords have meaning only because of contrast-effects with other words.  'Red' means what it does only by contrast with 'blue', 'green', etc."  That, of course, is wrong.  'Red' refers to the range of electromagnetic wavelengths that excite one of the three sets of cones in the human eye.  The response of these cones can be quantitatively measured and looks like:

'Red', 'green', and 'blue' are not social constructs whose meaning may vary depending upon cultural influences.  They are definable with scientific precision.

It seems clear that deconstructivists avoid specifics because, once the specifics are exposed, their philosophy is reduced to foolishness.